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CHADHA AND THE PUBLIC LANDS: IS FLPMA
AFFECTED?
Timothy R. Baker
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal government owns approximately fifty percent of the land
in the eleven contiguous western states, ranging from twenty-nine percent
in the State of Washington, to more than eighty-five percent in the State of
Nevada.'
Despite the significant environmental, recreational, and economic
considerations inherent in the federal ownership of public lands, 2 a
comprehensive framework for the management of these lands was not
developed until the Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA) was
enacted in 1976.3
In part, FLPMA was a response to the realization that the public
lands were not being managed in an orderly and efficient fashion. This
mismanagement was partially the result of an apparent lack of coordina-
tion between the executive branch agencies administering these lands.4
With the enactment of FLPMA, Congress attempted to reassert its
control over the public lands. In FLPMA, Congress delegated much of its
1. Phipps, The Public Land Law Review Commission-A Challenge to the West, I LAND &
WATER REV. 355 (1966). The federal government owns approximately 761 million acres of land, of
which 725 million acres are designated as public lands. U.S. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 19 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
PLLRCj.
2. The economic aspects of the federal ownership of public lands are significant. In 1973, gross
receipts from the sale of public land resources exceeded 788 million dollars. The public lands produced
approximately 11 million board feet of lumber, 176 million barrels of petroleum, one trillion cubic feet
of natural gas, 594 million gallons of gasoline and liquid petroleum gas, 14 million short tons of coal, 13
million short tons of potash, and 19 million animal unit-months of livestock forage. See U.S. BUREAU
OF LAND MANAGEMENT, PUBuc LAND STATISTICS, at 73-109, 168 (1973); U.S. FOREST SERVICE,
REPORT OF THE CHIEF, at 33-37, 53 (1973); Note, Proprietary Duties of the Federal Government
Under the Public Land Trust, 75 MICH. L. REV. 586 (1977).
3. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
4. This fact was brought to the attention of Congress by the report of the Public Land Law
Review Commission, which stated that "[the Commission experiences] great difficulty in trying to
determine with any precision the extent of existing Executive withdrawals and the degree to which
withdrawals overlap each other. We have found that the agencies do not have accurate records that
show the purposes fot which specific areas have been withdrawn and the uses that can be made of such
areas under the public land laws." PLLRC, supra note 1, at 52.
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constitutional authority5 to various agencies within the executive branch,
but reserved the power of review over the use of these delegated powers
through the implementation of several legislative veto provisions within the
Act.' This power of review ensured executive branch compliance with the
congressional policy directives of FLPMA.
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,7 the United
States Supreme Court held that the legielative veto provision within the
Immigration and Nationality Act8 was unconstitutional as a violation of
the bicameral and presentment requirements contained in Article I of the
Constitution.' This comment focuses on the effects of the Chadha decision
upon FLPMA.
II. PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT BEFORE FLPMA
The Constitution expressly grants to Congress the authority to
"dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States."10 In the past
however, the executive branch exercised some of this power under implied
authority, first recognized in United States v. Midwest Oil."
The holding in Midwest Oil resulted from decades of congressional
acquiescence in the withdrawal of public lands by the executive branch. 12
Throughout the first one hundred years of our nation's history, Congress
enacted many statutes authorizing the executive branch to make certain
withdrawals of public lands for specific purposes. The executive with-
drawal of public lands became such a frequent occurrence that its validity
was never challenged."3
5. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
6. Congress retained the power to veto certain sales and withdrawals of public land proposed by
the Secretary of the Interior. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1713(c), 1714 (1976).
7. - U.S..- 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
8. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § I provides that "[A]II legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." U.S.
CoNsr. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 provides that "[E]very Bill which shall have passed the Houseof Representatives
and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United
States; .. "
10. U.S. CoNsT. art IV, § 3, cl. 2.
11. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
12. Essentially, a withdrawal of land serves to preclude the operating effect of an existing statute
which provides for a different disposal or use of that land. See infra note 14, and discussion relating
thereto.
13. The Supreme Court noted in Midwest Oil that "prior to the year 1910 there had been issued:
99 Executive Orders establishing or enlarging Indian Reservations;
109 Executive Orders establishing or enlarging Military Reservations and setting
apart land for water, timber, fuel, hay, signal stations, target ranges and rights of way for use
in connection with Military Reservations;
44 Executive Orders establishing Bird Reserves"
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In 1909, President Taft withdrew approximately three million acres
of western lands believed to contain oil. The validity of this order was
challenged and upheld in Midwest Oil. The United States Supreme Court
reasoned that "the long-continued practice [of executive withdrawals of
land], known to and acquiesced in by Congress, [raised] a presumption
that the withdrawals had been made in pursuance of its consent or of a
recognized administrative power of the Executive in the management of
the public lands." '14
Prior to this opinion, Congress had attempted to clarify some of these
executive withdrawal powers by enacting the General Withdrawal [Pick-
ett] Act of 1910.15 This was the only instance prior to FLPMA that such a
general delegation of withdrawal and reservation powers had been made by
Congress to the Executive.
In 1940, the authority of the executive branch to make withdrawals of
public lands was again challenged. The Attorney General, Robert Jackson,
was asked to issue an opinion in regard to this matter. Jackson's first
opinion, written in 1940, concluded that outside of the Pickett Act of 1910,
the Executive had no withdrawal authority.1 6 This opinion, however, was
never officially published. In 1941, Attorney General Jackson published a
second opinion concluding that the restrictions of the Pickett Act applied
only to temporary withdrawals of land by the executive, and that under the
authority of Midwest Oil, the Executive had the implied power to make
permanent withdrawals.1
In 1952, the President delegated all of his withdrawal authority,
express and implied, to the Secretary of the Interior.18 Until the enactment
of FLPMA in 1976, the Secretary of the Interior often relied upon the
nonstatutory, implied authority of the Executive in making withdrawals of
public lands.
In 1964, Congress initiated an in-depth review of public land
management policies. The Public Land Law Review Commission (PL-
LRC) was created to help fulfill this purpose.19
United States v. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459, 470 (1915).
14. Id. at 474.
15. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 421, § 1, 36 Stat. 847 (repealed Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90
Stat. 2792 (1976)).
16. Wheatley, Withdrawals Under the Federal Land Policy Management Act of1976,21 ARIZ.
L. REV. 310, 315 (1979) (citingUnpublished dp. of Att'y Gen., June 25, 1940 (withdrawn) reprinted
in C. WHEATLEY, STUDY OF WITHDRAWALS AND RESERVATIONS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN LANDS at app. B-
6 to B-lI app. (1969)).
17. 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 73 (1941).
18. Exec. Order No. 10,355, 17 Fed. Reg. 4831 (1952).
19. See Public Land Law Review Commission Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1400 (1970).
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III. THE FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT
(FLPMA) OF 1976
The PLLRC was formed to serve as an expert advisory board and to
assist Congress in reorganizing the existing structure of public land
management. Congress recognized the need for a comprehensive system of
public land management, and acknowledged its own failure to provide such
a program.20
In 1970, the PLLRC filed its final report. This report called for
Congress to "assert its constitutional authority by enacting legislation
reserving unto itself exclusive authority to withdraw or otherwise set aside
public lands for specified limited-purpose uses."'" The report advised
Congress to restrict the power of the Executive by "delineating [a] specific
delegation of authority to the Executive as to the types of withdrawals and
set asides that may be effected without legislative action." 2 The PLLRC
recommended that the government's long-standing policy of disposal of the
public lands be changed to one of retention and management.2 3 Congres-
sional control and review was the underlying philosophy of the PLLRC
report. According to the Commission, the large scale management of the
public lands should be controlled by Congress through legislation. The
executive branch, in its administrative discretion, should conduct the daily
management activities, subject to congressional review.
In drafting the final version of FLPMA, Congress attempted to
adhere to the recommendations of the PLLRC. The members of Congress
recognized that the actions of the executive branch in public land
management were not always consistent with the best interests of the
people.24 Further, concern was expressed over what the public perceived as
"excessive disposals of public lands on the one hand and excessive
restrictions on the other .... ,,25 FLPMA was designed to both promote
20. See S. REP. No. 1444,88th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3741, 3743-3744. See also Public Land Law Review Commission Act § 2, 43 U.S.C. § 1392
(1970) which states:
[Tihe public land laws of the United States have developed over a long period of years
through a series of Acts of Congress which are not fully correlated with each other and
.... those laws , may be inadequate to meet the . . . needs of the American
people ...
21. PLLRC; supra note 1, at 2.
22. Id.
23. Id. at I. This policy of retention underlying FLPMA "burdens the western public land states
with the prospect of significant federal land holdings within their boundaries in perpetuity. . .[and] is
often cited as a major cause of the [Sagebrush] Rebellion." Clayton, The Sagebrush Rebellion:L Who
Should Control the Public Lands?, 12 LAND USE & ENV'T L. REV. 3 (1981).
24. H.R. REP. No. 94-1163,94th Cong., 2d Sess. I reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6175.
25. H.R. REP. No. 94-1163, supra note 24, at 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6175, 6177.
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consistency in public land management and "[e]stablish procedures to
facilitate Congressional oversight of public land operations entrusted to
the Secretary of the Interior."26
The final draft of FLPMA was severely criticized by the heads of
various agencies within the executive branch. In their opinion, the Act was
far too restrictive. They asserted that the provisions calling for congres-
sional review were unconstitutional, and represented "a serious infringe-
ment on the power of the Executive in the day to day administration of the
public lands."27 The reasons underlying this strong opposition on the part
of the executive branch are readily apparent from a review of some of the
provisions of FLPMA.
That Congress intended through FLPMA to maintain a tight reign
upon the administrative discretion of the executive branch is best demon-
strated by the provisions of the Act governing the sale and withdrawal of
public lands by the Secretary of the Interior. As evidenced in Midwest Oil
and by subsequent events, this area of public lands management is a source
of conflict between Congress and the Executive, and these provisions are
some of the tightest restrictions upon the executive branch in FLPMA. The
Act provides that sales or withdrawals of public lands by the Secretary of
the Interior in excess of certain acreages are subject to annulment by
concurrent resolution of Congress. 28 At the same time, FLPMA expressly
repeals the implied authority of the Executive to withdraw lands under
Midwest Oil.29 Further, the Act provides that upon receiving notification
from certain committees within either house of Congress, the Secretary of
the Interior shall immediately make an "emergency withdrawal" of those
public lands designated in such notification.3 0
These provisions clearly illustrate that by enacting FLPMA, Con-
gress intended to reassert control over the use and disposition of the public
26. H.R. REP. No. 94-1163, supra note 24, at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6175, 6176.
27. Letter from Thomas S. Kleppe, U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of the Secretary, to
Hon. James A. Haley, Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs (April 28, 1976). H.R.
REP. No. 94-1163, supra note 24, at 53, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6175,6227.
28. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 203(c), (codified
at 43 U.S.C. § 1713(c) (1976)), provides that sales of public lands proposed by the Secretary of the
Interior in excess of two thousand five hundred acres may be vetoed by concurrent resolution of
Congress.
Withdrawals of public lands proposed by the Secretary of the Interior aggregating five thousand acres
or more may be disapproved by concurrent resolution of Congress. Id. at § 204(c) (codified at 43
U.S.C. § 1714(c)).
29. Id. at § 704(a), 90 Stat. at 2792. In addition to repealing the implied authority of the
Executive to withdraw public lands, this section also repealed all of the statutes granting the Executive
express authority to withdraw public lands.
30. Id. at § 204(e) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1976)).
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lands."'
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE VETO AND THE Chadha DECISION
Typically, a legislative veto provision authorizes one or both houses of
Congress, or even committees, to annul by resolution an action or rule of
the executive branch or an administrative agency. Usually, the President is
not given the power to veto the resolution. 2
The legislative veto was first used in 1932, when Congress provided
broad authority to President Hoover to reorganize the executive branch.
Congress retained the power to review the exercise of this broad authority
by providing that any proposed reorganization plan could be vetoed by
either house.33 Despite doubts about the constitutionality of the legislative
veto,34 this type of provision has been widely used by Congress in almost
every area of federal regulation,3" including public lands management 6
and immigration.3
Jagdish Rai Chadha entered the United States on a student visa.
After his visa expired, he applied under the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) for a suspension of his deportation. 8 The Attorney General
agreed to suspend his deportation. The House of Representatives, pursuant
to a legislative veto provision in the INA,39 overruled Chadha's deportation
suspension, and in 1975 the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) ordered his deportation.
Chadha petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, arguing that the legislative veto provision contained in the INA
was unconstitutional. The INS agreed with Chadha's contentions. Both
31. See Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383, 395 (D. Wyo. 1980).
32. Smith & Struve, Aftershocks of the Fall of the Legislative Veto, 69 A.B.A.J. 1258 (1983).
33. Act of June 30, 1932, ch. 314, § 407, 47 Stat. 414.
34. Compare Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional
Power, 68 VA. L. REV. 253 (1982) (opposed to the use of the legislative veto) with Javits & Klein,
Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 455
(1977) (in favor of the use of the legislative veto).
35. "Since 1932, when the first veto provision was enacted into law, 295 congressional veto-type
procedures have been inserted in 196 different statutes. . . [including] at least one hundred sixty-three
such provisions. . . in eighty-nine laws [from 1970 through 1975]." Abourezk, The Congressional
Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.
REv. 323, 324 (1977).
36. See supra notes 26 & 28. In addition to these sections of FLPMA, it appears that §§ 202(e),
204(f), 204(l), and 214(b) also contain legislative veto provisions. Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, §§ 202(e), 204(0,204(I), 214(b) (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1712(e), 1714(f), 1714(l), and 1722(b) (1976)).
37. The Immigration and Nationality Act, § 244(c)(2) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2)
(1982)).
38. Id. at § 244(a)(1) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1)).
39. See supra note 37.
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the Senate and House of Representatives filed briefs in opposition. The
Ninth Circuit found that the legislative veto provision within the INA
violated the doctrine of separation of powers, as it infringed upon the
powers of both the executive and the judiciary.40
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Ninth
Circuit.41 The opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger for a six-justice
majority, stressed the importance of the bicameral and presentment
requirements of the Constitution. 2 The majority reasoned that congres-
sional action, pursuant to the INA legislative veto provision, was "legisla-
tive in character and effect," since it altered "the legal rights, duties, and
relations of persons,. . . outside the legislative branch. ' 43 Consequently,
this type of congressional action was subject to the bicameral and
presentment requirements, which were not satisfied by the legislative veto
provision."
As a preliminary concern, the Court examined the severability of the
legislative veto provision from the remainder of the INA. Congress
contended that the legislative veto provision was inseverable from the
INA,'45 and as a result, the entire act was unconstitutional. This would have
stripped the Attorney General of his authority to suspend deportations,
and denied relief to Chadha. Justice Rehnquist adopted this view, and it
was the basis of his dissent.46 The majority however, concluded that the
veto provision was severable from the INA. They reasoned that the
legislative history of the challenged provisions within the INA made it
clear that Congress would have enacted those provisions without a
legislative veto. Further, the INA contained a severability clause which
allowed severance of any invalid lrovisions from the Act.47 These factors,
according to the majority, gave rise to a presumption of severability. 48
Justice Powell concurred with the result reached by the majority.
However, he concluded that by exercising a legislative veto, Congress was
40. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980).
41. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, - U.S. _ 103 S. Ct. 2764
(1983).
42. See supra note 9.
43. INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2784. This test set forth by the Supreme Court is much broader
than the test used by the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit had noted the possible validity of legislative
veto provisions other than the one before it. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d at 432-3.
44. INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2787.
45. More specifically, Congress contended that the legislative veto provision, § 244(c)(2) of the
INA, was inseverable from the remainder of § 244, which granted to the Attorney General the
authority to suspend deportations. See supra notes 35 & 36.
46. INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2816 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982).
48. INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2774.
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usurping the judicial function, not the legislative.4 9
Both Justices Rehnquist and White dissented. Justice White criti-
cized the broad, sweeping nature of the court's opinion.5" He concluded
that only bills or their equivalents were subject to the bicameral and
presentment requirements. Congressional action pursuant to a legislative
veto provision was not in this category since new law was not created. 1
Justice White also joined in the dissent of Justice Rehnquist.52
V. THE EFFECTS OF Chadha UPON FLPMA
Today the Court not only invalidates § 244(c) (2) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, but also sounds the death knell for
nearly 200 other statutory provisions in which Congress has
reserved a "legislative veto." '53
This prophetic excerpt from the dissent of Justice White, noting the
probable broad application of the holding in Chadha, has been confirmed
by subsequent court decisions." Given the factual background of each of
these decisions, it is clear that the Chadha ruling was intended to generally
invalidate all legislative veto provisions.55 However, for a number of
reasons, the effects of the Chadha decision upon FLPMA are unclear.
There is a strong basis for distinguishing the rationale of Chadha from its
applicability to FLPMA. Clearly, the most viable theory for drawing this
distinction is that the Chadha ruling and its progeny restrict only the
congressional exercise of Article I powers, whereas FLPMA is based upon
the proprietary powers vested in Congress under Article IV.56 This line of
reasoning was recently considered in National Wildlife Federation v.
Watt5I7 (NWF).
In NWF, the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
49. Id. at 2789 (Powell, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 2796 (White, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 2806.
52. See supra note 46, and accompanying text.
53. INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2792 (White, J., dissenting).
54. See Consumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd mem. sub nom. United
States Senate v. FTC,.- U.S. _.._, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983); Consumer Energy Council of America
v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), arid mem. sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v.
Consumers Energy Council of America, - U.S. _ 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
55. Both Consumers Union and Consumer Energy Council involved regulatory agencies (as
opposed to an executive branch agency such as the INS), and administrative rules (as opposed to an
adjudicatory order as in Chadha). The Consumer Energy Council case involved a two-house veto
provision. For additional discussion on the effects of these two decisions, see Strauss, Was There a Baby
in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J.
789.
56. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
57. 571 F. Supp. 1145 (D.D.C. 1983).
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pursuant to § 204(e) of FLPMA,58 requested Interior Secretary Watt to
make an emergency withdrawal of certain federal lands from a region
designated for future coal leasing. Nevertheless, Secretary Watt pro-
ceeded to sell coal leases for the lands requested by the House Committee
to be withdrawn.5' The plaintiffs filed suit seeking to enjoin the enforce-
ment of the leases that were sold. 0
The plaintiffs contended that § 204(e) of FLPMA was not a legislative
veto, and cited Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt61 as authority for this
contention. The plaintiffs also classified § 204(e) as a "report and wait"
statute, approved by the Supreme Court in Chadha as a valid exercise of
power.62 In addition, the plaintiffs reasoned that § 204(e) [and FLPMA in
general] was not an exercise of legislative power as restricted in Chadha,
but instead arose from the proprietary power of Congress over the public
lands. Finally, the plaintiffs urged that the defendant was bound by his own
regulations that called for compliance with emergency withdrawal re-
quests of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.
63
Secretary Watt responded by arguing that the decision in Pacific
Legal Foundation was based upon the Ninth Circuit's opinion of
Chadha," and did not survive as viable precedent under the subsequent
Supreme Court decision. The Secretary also contended that the applica-
tion of the Chadha decision extended to the congressional exercise of
Article IV powers, and cited United States v. California65 as authority for
58. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1976).
59. At this point, the Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order to prevent the proposed
lease sale. This request was denied, and the sale of the coal leases was completed.
60. The Wilderness Society was also a plaintiff to this action. The Honorable Morris K. Udall,
U.S. Rep., Ariz., Chairman of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, intervened as a
plaintiff. The four coal companies which were successful bidders at the lease sale intervened as
defendants.
61. 529 F. Supp. 982 (D. Mont. 1982). This case involves the "emergency withdrawal" of
certain public lands from proposed leasing, pursuant to § 204(e) of FLPMA. The district court
concluded that this provision only allows Congress to temporarily prevent the Secretary of the Interior
from leasing the designated public lands. The scope and duration of the requested "emergency
withdrawal" was left to the discretion of the Secretary. On this basis, the court determined that §
204(e) of FLPMA was sufficiently similar to traditional Congressional committee powers to pass
Constitutional muster.
62. A "report and wait" statute requires an administrative agency to report its proposed
activities or rules to Congress. However, Congress cannot unilaterally veto such proposed activities or
rules. Rather, a "report and wait" statute gives Congress the opportunity to review these proposed
activities or rules before they become effective, and to pass legislation barring their effectiveness if they
are found objectionable. INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2776 n. 9.
63. 43 C.F.R. § 2310.5 (1982).
64. The decision reached by the Honorable Judge Jameson in Pacific Legal Foundation was
based upon the Ninth Circuit's opinion of Chadha. Pacific Legal Foundation, 529 F. Supp. at 1002.
65. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).The defendant relied upon dictum from this
case which stated that only a formal Act of Congress pursuant to Article IV could divest the Attorney
General of his authority to bring suit on behalf of the government in an action regarding public lands.
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that position. Finally, the Secretary insisted that he was not bound by his
own regulations since they were derived from § 204(e), which was
unconstitutional.
The district court granted a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs,
primarily on the grounds that the defendant was required to comply with
his own regulations. In the opinion, the court considered the various
contentions of the parties.
The court reasoned that the application of Pacific Legal Foundation
as precedent was questionable in light of "the Supreme Court's reasoning
[in Chadha]."66 Further, the court refused to classify § 204(e) as a "report
and wait" provision similar to the type approved in Chadha.7 The opinion
of the district court did, however, place a great deal of emphasis upon the
distinction between the congressional powers under Article I and Article
IV.6 8 The court noted the more dominant and unrestricted role of Congress
in exercising its proprietary powers over the public lands, as opposed to its
purely legislative role under Article I.19 In addition, the opinion referred to
both the intent of the framers of the Constitution in giving these
proprietary powers to Congress, and the imposition of a settlor-trustee
relationship between Congress and the Executive in regard to the manage-
ment of the public lands. 0 Most importantly, the court reasoned that
United States v. California, as relied upon by the Secretary, 1 did not
support his position. In quoting from the California opinion, the district
court described the Article IV powers as being "without limita-
tion. . . .[and that] neither the courts nor the executive agencies could
proceed contrary to an Act of Congress in this congressional area of
national power."'7 2
The district court concluded that this language from United States v.
California "may well presage a decision that neither the defendant nor the
66. National Wildlife Federation, 571 F. Supp. at 1155, n.14.
67. Id. at 1155.
68. The court noted that "[Iln interpreting Article IV, the Supreme Court has stated that:
'Congress not only has a legislative power over the public domain, but it also exercises the powers of the
proprietor therein. . . like any other owner it may provide when, how and to whom its lands can be
sold.' " Id. at 1156. [citing United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459,474 (1915); Kleppe v. New
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 536-43 (1976)].
69. The district court cited United States v. California, the case relied upon by the Defendant, as
authority for that position. National Wildlife Federation, 571 F. Supp. at 1157. See supra note 65.
70. National Wildlife Federation, 571 F. Supp. at 1157. This reasoning makes sense in view of
the imposition of the public trust doctrine upon Congress. Hence, the Secretary of the Interior becomes
subject to the review of Congress, who in turn is accountable to the public under the doctrine. Light v.
United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954).
71. See supra note 65.
72. National Wildlife Federation, 571 F. Supp. at 1157 [citing United States v. California, 332
U.S. at 27].
[Vol. 5
19841 CHADA AND FLPMA
courts may 'proceed contrary' to [FLPMA]. '
Even if this line of reasoning is not followed, and Chadha is applicable
to FLPMA, there remains the issue of severability. Under the test set forth
in Chadha, if Congress would have made the same delegation of power to
the agency without the use of a legislative veto provision, then the
legislative veto provision itself would be severable from the remainder of
the Act.7 4 Clearly, the circumstances surrounding the enactment of
FLPMA, and the legislative history of that Act suggest that Congress
would not have given the Interior Secretary such broad discretion without
reserv:ng for itself the power of review.75 However, FLPMA also contains a
severability clause, similar to the provision of the INA that the Supreme
Court found to be partially determinative of the severability issue in
Chadha.6 Consequently, the severability question is not easily resolved.
Assuming that the legislative veto provisions within FLPMA are
inseverable, it is not clear how much of FLPMA should be invalidated.
Under Chadha, it seems that only the immediate corresponding section of
FLPMA would be affected.77 If this is the case, then it is possible that any
implied authority of the Interior Secretary to manage the public lands still
will be restricted under FLPMA.7 8 As a result, Congress would have to
enact new legislation to provide for the future administration of the public
lands.79 Further, inseverability could also lead to the invalidation of all past
73. Hence, the district court was concluding that Congress had, through a formal Act
(FLPMA), acted in a"congressional area of national power" to limit the authority of the Secretary of
the Interior to manage the public lands. National Wildlife Federation, 571 F. Supp. at 1157. Much to
the defendant's dismay, the California decision was being used against him. It is possible however, that
even under the rationale of National Wildlife Federation, the bicameralism requirements of the
constitution must still be complied with. This may lead to the invalidation of § 204(e) of FLPMA,
providing for "emergency withdrawals" of federal land. See Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt, 529 F.
Supp. at 1003.
74. INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2774.
75. See supra notes 22-31, & accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 47 & 48, & accompanying text. Section 707 of FLPMA, found as a note to
43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976), is the standard severability clause used by Congress, and is very similar to the
severability provision within the INA.
77. In Chadha, only the severability of § 244(c)(2) from § 244 was at issue. The Supreme Court
did not consider, or even mention the severability of § 244(c) (2) from the Immigration and Nationality
Act as a whole. In the context of FLPMA, this means that only §§ 202, 203, 204, and 214 would be
invalidated if the legislative veto provisions within those sections are found to be inseverable.
78. Since the remainder of FLPMA would be intact, it seems that the Act would still serve to
repeal the implied authority of the Executive to withdraw lands under Midwest Oil. See supra note 29.
However, if the withdrawal provisions of FLPMA are unconstitutional, it is possible that the repealing
effect of FLPMA would also be invalid. See 73 AM. JUR. 2d Statutes § 382 (1974).
79. This does not seem to be a desirable alternative. In part, FLPMA was enacted to avoid
piecemeal legislation, which had disrupted public land management in the past. It took Congress six
years to enact FLPMA. Should Congress now be forced to pass new legislation to replace invalidated
sections of the Act, the benefits of FLPMA may be lost in the political and bureaucratic shuffle that
would result. Of course, this is assuming that there are benefits of FLPMA to be lost, which is beyond
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actions taken by the Interior Secretary under FLPMA, since his authority
to so act was provided by an unconstitutional statute. Clearly, the
possibilities are endless. 80
VI. CONCLUSION
With the enactment of FLPMA, Congress has attempted to end the
confusion surrounding the management of the public lands by reasserting
its proprietary powers granted under Article IV of the Constitution.
Through FLPMA, the Interior Department has been given the authority to
manage the public lands on a daily basis. Major decisions in public land
management are to be made by the Secretary of the Interior within the
congressional policy directives of FLPMA, subject to congressional review
and "nonapproval." This power of review and "nonapproval" is provided
for by several legislative veto provisions within FLPMA.
In INS v. Chadha, the United States Supreme Court held that a
legislative veto provision under the Article I powers of Congress was
unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. This
holding has been broadly applied.
The effects of Chadha upon FLPMA are, however, unclear. The
recent decision of National Wildlife Federation v. Watt seems to provide
one answer. Upon examination of the scope and nature of the Article IV
proprietary powers of Congress over the public lands, the court concluded
that FLPMA may well be a valid exercise of those powers, and should not
be restricted by the Chadha decision.
But even if this reasoning is not accepted, and Chadha is applicable to
FLPMA, it is not clear how much of FLPMA should be invalidated. It is
arguable that the FLPMA legislative veto provisions are inseverable from
the remainder of the Act. This may lead to the invalidation of all of
FLPMA, in which case public land management would be set back ten
years, or to the invalidation of the Executive's authority to manage the
public lands. Either could lead to the revocation of every decision made by
the Interior Department under FLPMA.
If on the other hand, the legislative veto provisions are severable from
the remainder of FLPMA, then clearly Congress would have to either
amend the Act, or enact new legislation. In the meantime, the Interior
the scope of this article. In this regard, see Carver, BLM Organic Act, Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976: Fruition or Frustration, 54 DEN. L.J. 387 (1977). Even if the benefits of
FLPMA are minimal, and a new federal land management act is required, the best alternative still
seems to be to keep FLPMA intact, until a new act is passed.
80. While the possibilities are endless, the results are the same. Clearly, the invalidation of any
or all of FLPMA could have disastrous effects upon the future of public land management. See supra
note 79.
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Department would be restricted only by the broad policy directives
currently contained within FLPMA. Needless to say, these broad direc-
tives are subject to vastly different interpretations. This problem is further
compounded when there exists a sharp contrast in the philosophies of the
Executive and Congress toward public land management.
From a legal standpoint, the reasoning of National Wildlife Federa-
tion v. Watt provides the best answer. The proprietary powers of Congress
under Article IV do provide constitutional prerogatives transcending those
powers enjoyed by Congress in its purely legislative role under Article I.
Clearly, FLPMA is a valid exercise of those proprietary powers.81
From a practical standpoint, the same reasoning provides the best
alternative. Given both the confusion surrounding the severability issue
and possible alternatives, keeping FLPMA intact is best for the public
lands. To do otherwise only promotes the inconsistency and mismanage-
ment that existed prior to the enactment of FLPMA.
81. See P. Baldwin, The Effects of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha on
certain provisions in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Cong. Research Serv., Libr. of
Cong. (August 19, 1983, rev. September 14, 1983). Pamela Baldwin, a legislative attorney, at the
request of Congress, prepared a study of the possible effects of the Chadha decision upon FLPMA. In
her report, she concluded that the legislative veto provisions ivithin FLPMA would be invalidated.
Accordingly, she advised Congress to prepare new legislation.
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